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ABSTRACT: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a risk analysis 
tool which is used to define, identify, and eliminate known and/or potential 
failures from a system. The task is generally performed by a team of experts. 
Each of the team of experts can express diverse opinions in rating of failure 
modes of systems which may be in the form of precise data and imprecise 
distribution ratings. However the RPN of FMEA is incapable of using these 
various forms of information in the prioritisation of risk of failure modes. 
This is one of the main limitations of FMEA. Furthermore the technique is 
limited to the use of three decision criteria thereby excluding other important 
decision criteria such as production loss in prioritising risk. To address these 
problems a novel FMEA tool was proposed which combines Dempster Shafer 
Theory with the ELECTRE method to provide a more efficient failure mode 
prioritisation method. The Dempster Shafer Theory was used in aggregating 
different failure mode ratings from experts and the ELECTRE method was 
applied in the ranking of failure modes. The applicability of the proposed 
technique was demonstrated with a case study of a marine diesel engine. The 
results showed that the proposed method could be applied in addressing risk 
prioritisation problem more efficiently than the FMEA and its variants.  
KEYWORDS: Dempster Shafer Theory, ELECTRE method, FMEA, ship system. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Ship system operation requires high levels of safety and reliability and 
these can only be accomplished by having an effective maintenance 
system in place. Basically, maintenance system consists of three major 
elements that must perform optimally in order to attain high level 
of the ship system safety and reliability. The three main elements of 
maintenance management system are risk assessment, maintenance 
strategy selection and maintenance task interval determination. The 
focus in this paper is the risk assessment component and it is very 
central to the operation and maintenance of ship system because the 
maintenance task to be performed on each of the equipment item of 
the system is a function of the assessed risk. Failure Mode Effect and 
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Analysis (FMEA) is one of the most popular and powerful tools for 
assessing risk of ship systems [1, 2]. The technique was first proposed 
by NASA in the 1960s as a tool to identify and eliminate complex system 
failures in order for the system to achieve desirable levels of safety and 
reliability [3]. In analysing risk, FMEA puts into consideration how 
equipment items fail, the effect of an individual failure on the entire 
system and possible means of failure detection. Traditionally, FMEA 
uses Risk Priority Number (RPN) in evaluating and prioritising risk. 
FMEA is defined as the product of three risk criteria; probability of 
Occurrence (O), resulting level of Severity (S) and the inverse of the 
ability to Detect (D) the failure before it occurs. In assigning values to 
these three risk decision criteria an ordinal scale of 1‐10 is generally 
applied by most researchers and industries [1,4,5]. Despite the 
popularity of the FMEA it has some limitations which has affected the 
efficiency of the tool in prioritising the risk of failure modes of most 
complex system of which the ship system is not excluded. Some of 
these limitations are: (1) the inability of the tool to utilise more than 
three decision criteria in prioritising risk of failure mode (2) the inability 
of the tool to consider the relative importance of decision criteria in 
the risk decision making process (3) the inability of the technique to 
utilise imprecise information from experts and (4) the questionable and 
debatable mathematical formula use in aggregating risk criteria[4, 6].
To overcome the limitations of the traditional FMEA, different 
techniques based on the Multi‐Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) have 
been developed in literature. Braglia [7] presents a technique based on 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The AHP is used as an alternative 
to the RPN in aggregating four risk criteria; O, S, D and expected cost, 
for the prioritisation of causes of failure for an Italian refrigerator 
manufacturing firm. Zammori and Gabbrielli [8] propose Analytical 
Network Process (ANP) approach for prioritising failures in FMEA 
system. The authors consider three risk criteria, O, S and D in prioritising 
risk of failure mode. The use of the ANP allows the interrelationship 
between risk criteria to be considered in the decision making process. 
Maheswaran and Loganathan [9] present a methodology based on 
Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment Evaluation 
(PROMETHEE as an alternative for the RPN used in the traditional 
FMEA, for ranking risk of failure modes of a boiler system.
All of the aforementioned papers have improved the efficiency of the 
traditional FMEA system, as it is possible to utilise more than three 
decision criteria in the ranking of risk of failure mode. Furthermore, 
the risk of different failure modes is better distinguished with various 
MCDM tools than the RPN of the FMEA system. However, the MCDM 
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tools applied increases the evaluation process complexity as the 
number of decision criteria increases. Furthermore, the techniques only 
allow the use of precise information from the experts in the decision 
making process whereas in real life situation the data may be precise 
or imprecise or a combination of both.
There is a need to develop a more systematic approach for prioritising 
risk of failure modes of ship systems. In order to overcome the 
challenges of the traditional FMEA and its variants in literature this 
study proposed a novel FMEA tool which combined Dempster Shafer 
Theory with the ELECTRE method. The Dempster Shafer theory 
technique was applied in aggregating different assessment which may 
be precise or imprecise from the experts that make up the FMEA team. 
The ELECTRE method is applied in the ranking of risk of failure modes 
of the ship system.
2.0  METHODOLOGY
2.1  Dempster Shafer Combination theory
The origin of Dempster Shafer Theory (DST) can be traced to Dempster 
[10] who develops the theory of upper and lower probabilities and 
Shafer [11] who further improves on the technique. The tool has been 
used in different fields in modelling and aggregating empirical evidence 
in individual’s mind. DST has been integrated with the RCM logic tree 
in the selection of optimum maintenance strategy for different complex
systems [12]. The technique has been applied in solving data 
inconsistency in reliability decision problem. Due to its remarkable 
success in addressing problem of data uncertainty in different domain, 
it is combined with the ELECTRE method in this paper to address 
the problem of data imprecision in risk prioritisation problem of ship 
system. The basics of the DST are presented in this section and are as 
follows [12, 13]:
Let  be a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypothesis. 
The set generally refers to the frame of discernment. A function m(Y) is 
defined as the Basic Belief Assignment (BBA) if the following conditions
are satisfied.
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Table  3  is  used  to  demonstrate  the  Dempster  Shafer  Theory 
combination rule application. From Table 3, the risk rating of criterion 













which denotes the degree of conflict between two bodies of evidence, 
Y and Z.
The application of this combination rule for aggregating different 
opinions of experts as it concerns risk of failure modes prioritisation is 
described as follows [4, 6].
 = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10] i.e. ordinal scale 1 to 10 rating for risk decision 
criteria; m(Y) represents t e probability rating given by experts which 
support roposition Y. Y is the specific value from the set  to a decision 
criterion.
Example: The criterion D, rated by two experts for failure mode 1 in 
Table 3 is used to demonstrate he Dempster Shafer Theory combination 
rule application. From Table 3, the risk rating of criterion D, by expert 1 
is 4:70% and 3:30% and that of expert 2 is 4:40% and 5:60%.
The discernment frame for this problem is formed as  = [3, 4, 5] and the 
BBA  is as follows:
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For this problem, expert 1 and 2 combine rating for criterion, D,
= 3 × 0 + 4 × 1 + 5 × 0 = 4
2.2 ELECTRE METHOD
The ELECTRE method development and origin can be traced to Roy 
and Vincke [14] and the acronym, ELECTRE, stand for, Elimination 
and Et Choice Translating Reality. The basic concept of the multi 
criteria technique is based on paired comparisons of alternatives with 
reference to some certain decision criteria. The technique has been used 
by different researchers in solving multi‐criteria decision problems in 
different domain. Shanian, Milani, Carson and Abeyaratne [15] utilise 
the technique in solving a material selection problem and Sevkli [16] 
integrated ELECTRE with a fuzzy logic technique in addressing a 
supplier selection problem. The method is applied in this paper, to 
address the challenge of risk prioritisation of ship system. The steps 
involved in the ELECTRE method are as follows [17]:
Step 1: Decision matrix formation: ELECTRE method process begins 
with the construction of a decision matrix with alternatives, j with 
respect to criteria, i. Since the Dempster Shafer theory is integrated with 
the method, the evaluated data from the Dempster Shafer combination 
rule is used to form the decision matrix. An example of such a decision 
matrix with element xij is presented in Table 1.
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 Step 2: Normalisation of the decision matrix: The normalisation of the 
decision matrix xij is performed as follows:
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Where pij is the normalised decision matrix
Step 3: Weighted normalised matrix formation:
The weighted normalised matrix vij is obtained by multiplying 
decision criteria weights, wj, with the normalised decision matrix and 
is presented as follows:
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The  eighted  nor alised  atrix  vij  is  obtained  by  ultiplying 
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Step 4: oncordance interval atrix for ation: iven a pair of failure 
odes, (alternatives) Aj and Ak, the concordance index c1(j1, k) can be 
esti ated as the su  of al  eights for those decision criteria here 
the eighted nor alised score of Aj is greater than or equal to Ak, as 
fol o s:
















modes,  (alternatives) Aj and Ak,  the concordance  index  c n be 













    (4)
Where vi(j) and vi(k) are the weighted normalised scores of the jth and kth 
alternatives respectively. The concordance evaluation results are then 
used to form the concordance matrix as follows:
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Step 4: Discordance interval matrix formation: The discordance index 














Two  indices, net superior values, Ca, and net  inferior values, Da use  for 












The information obtained from the discordance index is then used to 
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Step 5: Determination of the performance index:
Two in , t superior values, Ca, and net inferior values, Da use for 
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The two performa ce indices for prioritising failure modes ill yield 
two ranking . The two rankings can either be applied individually or 
both can be averag d to generate o eral  ranking.
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3.0  CASE STUDY
In this section, the marine diesel engine is considered to demonstrate 
the suitability of the integrated Dempster Shafer theory and ELECTRE 
method. The marine diesel engine was chosen because it is one of the 
key ship machinery systems as it provides the power for the propulsion 
of the entire ship system. In addition, the marine main engine accounts 
for over 45 percent of the total compensation for fault accident claims 
of the entire ship system according to the survey carried out by a Swiss 
shipping insurance Company [18]. It is then obvious that the marine 
diesel engine is central to the operation, of not only the machinery 
systems, but of the entire ship system powered by this type of engine. 
A total of 23 failure modes were identified in bits from combinations of 
different sources such as literatures, data logged records and experts’ 
opinions. Causes of failure, together with effects for each of the failure 
mode are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: FMEA for marine diesel engine [2, 5, 20‐24]
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In this paper, it is assumed that the FMEA team consists of two experts 
with equal expertise. Each of the expert ranks each of the 23 failure 
modes based on 3 decision criteria; O, S and D on an ordinal scale of 
1‐10. Table 3 represents the failure modes rating by two experts of which 
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some are precise and others are imprecise rating. Because the proposed 
methodology utilised decision criteria weights in the decision making 
process, these weights were evaluated using the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) see[19] for description of the AHP. The weights obtained 
for O, S and D, using AHP are 0.4, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively.
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O  S  D  O  S  D 
1  7:30%  3  4:70%    7:30%  4  4:40% 
8:70%    3:30%    8:70%    5:60% 
2  7  6:50%  8    6  6  7 
  5:50%     
3  5  6  5: 100%    5  8  6 
4  7  3  3: 80%    7:70%  4  4 
    2: 20%    6:30%     
5  7: 100%  6  5: 50%    6  7  5:80% 
    4:50%        6:20% 
…  …  …  …    …  …  … 
23  7:80%  2  9:90%    7:60%  3  9 
6:20%    8:10%    5:40%     
 
 
The  Dempster  Shafer  combination  technique  was  applied  to  the 
imprecise  ratings  of  decision  criteria  by  expert  1  and  2  in  Table  3  to 
obtain aggregated  ratings. The aggregated  ratings were used  to  form a 
decision matrix (refer to Table 4 ) which was then used as input data into 
the ELECTRE tool for the ranking of failure modes.  
The Dempster Shafer combination technique was applied to the 
imprecise ratings of decision criteria by expert 1 and 2 in Table 3 to 
obtain aggregated ratings. The aggregated ratings were used to form 
a decision matrix (refer to Table 4 ) which was then used as input data 
into the ELECTRE tool for the ranking of failure modes.
Table 4: Decision matrix




Failure mode  O  S  D 
1  7.84  3.5  4 
2  6.5  5.89  5.5 
3  5  7  5.5 
4  6.95  3.5  3 
5  6.5  6.5  5 
…  …  …  … 
23  7  2.5  8.99 
 
 
In applying  the ELECTRE method  to rank risk of  failure modes,  the 
decision  matrix  in  Table  4  was  normalised  using  Eq.  2.  Then, 
weighted  normalised  decision  matrix  was  obtained  which  is  a 
product  of  the  normalised  decision  matrix  and  the  weights  of  the 
decision  criteria.  The  formation  of  the  concordance  interval  matrix 
and  the  discordance  interval matrix  using  Eq.  4  and  6  respectively 
was  then  performed.  Based  on  the  concordance  matrix  and  the 
discordance matrix, the net superior, Ca, and net  inferior, Da, values 
of  the different  failure modes were calculated using Eq. 8 and 9 and 





the  net  superior  index,  the  greater  the  value  the  higher  the  risk 
possess by the failure mode. In applying the net  inferior value  index 
in determining performance of the different failure modes, the lower 
the net  inferior value  the higher  the risk  the  failure mode possess  to 
the system. 
 
From  Table  5,  the  two  ranking  indices  produce  quite  dissimilar 
rankings  for all  the 23  failure modes. The net superior  index ranked 
failure mode 10 in the first position and as such was the most critical 
failure  mode  of  the  marine  diesel  engine.  The  net  inferior  index 
ranked the same failure mode in the second position.  
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In applying the ELECTRE method to rank risk of failure modes, the 
decision matrix in Table 4 was normalised using Eq. 2. Then, weighted 
normalised decision matrix was obtained which is a product of the 
normalised decision matrix and the weights of the decision criteria. 
The formation of the concordance interval matrix and the discordance 
interval matrix using Eq. 4 and 6 respectively was then performed. 
Based on the concordance matrix and the discordance matrix, the 
net superior, Ca, and net inferior, Da, values of the different failure 
modes were calculated using Eq. 8 and 9 and the results are presented 
in Table 5. Finally, the different failure modes were ranked using their 
net superior and inferior values and the rankings generated are also 
presented in Table 5. The performance of the different failure modes 
could be determined by applying either the net superior index or net 
inferior index or an average of both. For the net superior index, the 
greater the value the higher the risk possess by the failure mode. In 
applying the net inferior value index in determining performance of 
the different failure modes, the lower the net inferior value the higher 
the risk the failure mode possess to the system.
From Table 5, the two ranking indices produce quite dissimilar rankings 
for all the 23 failure modes. The net superior index ranked failure mode 
10 in the first position and as such was the most critical failure mode of 
the marine diesel engine. The net inferior index ranked the same failure 
mode in the second position.





Failure modes  Ca  Rank  Da  Rank 
1  ‐0.4000  14  0.9508  14 
2  1.6000  9  ‐9.4283  5 
3  2.4000  7  ‐7.8602  7 
4  ‐8.6000  23  12.9899  20 
5  4.2000  6  ‐13.3375  3 
6  0.2000  13  ‐5.1153  10 
7  ‐6.6000  19  17.5393  23 
8  7.2000  3  ‐17.5729  1 
9  2.4000  7  ‐11.5548  4 
10  11.2000  1  ‐16.3682  2 
11  ‐3.0000  16  12.7088  19 
12  ‐7.2000  21  14.2723  21 
13  ‐1.4000  15  9.1666  16 
14  1.2000  10  ‐3.8566  12 
15  5.6000  5  ‐5.8254  8 
16  0.6000  11  4.0543  15 
17  0.2000  12  0.6266  13 
18  8.4000  2  ‐5.3497  9 
19  ‐5.2000  18  10.3197  17 
20  6.4000  4  ‐9.0052  6 
21  ‐6.8000  20  12.4422  18 
22  ‐8.4000  22  14.3962  22 
23  ‐4.0000  17  ‐4.1927  11 
 
For  the  net  superior  index  failure  mode  4  ranked  in  the  last  position, 
indicating the least critical failure mode of the marine diesel engine while 
failure mode 7  ranked  in  the  last position by  the  inferior  index. The net 
superior  index  is  commonly  used  as  the  optimum  ranking  technique. 
However some researchers have combined the two performance indices to 
obtain  overall  ranking  of  alternatives.  The  net  superior  index  is 
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For the net superior index failure mode 4 ranked in the last position, 
indicating the least critical failure mode of the marine diesel engine 
while failure mode 7 ranked in the last position by the inferior index. 
The net superior index is commonly used as the optimum ranking 
technique. However some researchers have combined the two 
performance indices to obtain overall ranking of alternatives. The net 
superior index is recommended for risk prioritisation of ship system 
because it generates the same results as the PROMETHEE technique 
applied by Maheswaran and Loganathan [9]. This is illustrated in 
section 3.1.2.
From Table 5, the two ranking indices produce quite dissimilar rankings 
for all the 23 failure modes. The net superior index ranked failure mode 
10 in the first position and as such was the most critical failure mode 
of the marine diesel engine. The net inferior index ranked the same 
failure mode in the second position. For the net superior index failure 
mode 4 ranked in the last position, indicating the least critical failure 
mode of the marine diesel engine while failure mode 7 ranked in the 
last position by the inferior index. The net superior index is commonly 
used as the optimum ranking technique. However some researchers 
have combined the two performance indices to obtain overall ranking 
of alternatives. The net superior index is recommended for risk 
prioritisation of ship system because it generates the same results as 
the PROMETHEE technique applied by Maheswaran and Loganathan 
[9]. This is illustrated in section 3.1.2.
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3.1  Comparison of ELECTRE method with other methods
3.1.1  Comparison of the ELECTRE method with the conventional 
FMEA
As stated in the introduction section, one of the challenges of the 
conventional FMEA, is its inability to utilise imprecise information 
from experts. To overcome this challenge and for unbiased comparison 
with the proposed technique, the aggregated data shown in Table 4 was 
also used as an input into the conventional FMEA. The ranking of risk 
of failure modes produced by the two methods are shown in Figure 1.
From Figure 1, it is obvious that the rankings produced by the 
conventional FMEA differ considerably from that of the ELECTRE 
method as the majority of the failure modes are ranked differently. 
The variation is as a result of the limitations of the conventional FMEA 
which are as follows:
•  The inability of the FMEA to consider decision criteria weights in the 
decision making process whereas in the ELECTRE methodology, 
the decision criteria weights are put into consideration.
• The multiplication of O, S and D in evaluating RPN of the 






These  are  some  of  the  reasons  why  alternative  approaches  such  as 
MCDM based methodology  is recommended  in the  literature [7, 9]. The 






In  order  to  validate  the  novel  technique,  it  was  compared  with  the 
PROMETHEE  method  applied  by  Maheswaran  and  Loganathan  [9]. 
Maheswaran and Loganathan  [9]do not  consider  imprecise  information 
from  experts  but  use  crisp  values  in  the  decision  making  process. 
However,  in  order  to  allow  the  use  of  both  precise  and  imprecise 
information  from  experts,  the  data  in  Table  5  evaluated  with  the 
Dempster Shafer theory’s combination technique was used as an input in 
the PROMETHEE methodology. The results of a comparative analysis of 
both  the ELECTREE  and  the PROMETHEE  technique  are presented  in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison with conventional F
These are some of the reasons why alternative approaches such as 
MCDM based methodology is recommended in the literature [7, 9]. 
The proposed methodology discussed in this paper overcomes all of 
these limitations of the conventional FMEA.
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3.1.2  Comparison of the ELECTRE method with PROMETHEE 
method
In order to validate the novel technique, it was compared with the 
PROMETHEE method applied by Maheswaran and Loganathan 
[9]. Maheswaran and Loganathan [9]do not consider imprecise 
information from experts but use crisp values in the decision making 
process. However, in order to allow the use of both precise and 
imprecise information from experts, the data in Table 5 evaluated with 
the Dempster Shafer theory’s combination technique was used as an 
input in the PROMETHEE methodology. The results of a comparative 
analysis of both the ELECTREE and the PROMETHEE technique are 
presented in Figure 2.






From  Figure  2,  the  ELECTRE  method  (net  superior  (Ca))  and  the 
PROMETHEE  produces  the  same  rankings  for  the  23  failure modes. 
However  the ELECTRE method  (net  inferior  (Da)) produces different 
ranking  for  most  of  the  failure  modes.  On  this  basis,  the  ELECTRE 
method  (net  superior  (Ca))  is  recommended  for  prioritising  risk  of 
failure  modes  of  ship  systems.  Although,  Ca,  produces  the  same 
results  with  that  of  the  PROMETHEE  technique  applied  by 
Maheswaran and Loganathan [9], it is easy to apply irrespective of the 
number of decision criteria utilised in prioritising risk of failure mode 
as  opposed  to  PROMETHEE  whose  evaluation  process  complexity 
increases as the number of decision criteria increases. Furthermore, the 
ELECTRE method does  not  require  the maintenance  practitioners  to 
determine  the  preference  function  for  each  of  the  decision  criteria 
which  is  one  of  the drawbacks  of  the PROMETHEE  technique.   The 
PROMETHEE  technique as applied by Maheswaran and Loganathan 
[9]  for  risk  of  failure  mode  prioritisation  only  considers  precise 





Figure 2: o parison ith PROMETHEE method
From Figure 2, the EL  et  (net superior (Ca)) and the 
PROMETHEE produces the sa e rankings for the 23 failure modes. 
However the ELECTRE method (net inferior (Da)) produces different 
ranking for most of the failure modes. On this basis, the ELECTRE 
method (net superior (Ca)) is recommended for prioritising risk of 
failure modes of ship systems. Although, Ca, produces the same results 
with that of the PROMETHEE technique applied by Maheswaran 
and Loganathan [9], it is easy to apply irrespective of the number of 
decision criteria utilised in prioritising risk of failure mode as opposed 
to PROMETHEE whose evaluation process complexity increases as 
the number of decisi n criteria increases. Furthermore, the ELECTRE 
method does not require the mai tenance practitioners t  determine 
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the preference function for each of the decision criteria which is one 
of the drawbacks of the PROMETHEE technique. The PROMETHEE 
technique as applied by Maheswaran and Loganathan [9] for risk of 
failure mode prioritisation only considers precise information from 
experts and in most real life situation, information may be precise 
and imprecise. The integration of the Dempster Shafer combination 
technique with the ELECTRE method and PROMETHEE method make 
it possible for both techniques to utilise both precise and imprecise data 
from experts.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to develop a systematic approach for 
risk prioritisation which avoids the limitations of the traditional FMEA 
and its variant in order for risk to be prioritised more effectively. To 
achieve this objective a novel FMEA tool which combines the Dempster 
Shafer Theory with the ELECTRE method is presented. The Dempster 
Shafer Theory is used to aggregate imprecise failures modes rating 
from experts while the ELECTRE method is used in the ranking of 
failure modes. In demonstrating the applicability and validity of the 
proposed method, a case study of marine diesel engine is applied. The 
results of the case study analysis reveal the following:
•  The proposed method distinguishes failure mode from each 
other than the traditional FMEA approach whilst avoiding the 
limitations of the traditional FMEA such as inability to utilise 
imprecise information from experts.
•  The proposed method produces almost completely the same results 
as that of the PROMETHEE technique used by Maheswaran and 
Loganathan [9] thereby validating the proposed approach.
•  The proposed technique is easy to apply irrespective of number of 
decision criteria used in prioritising risk of failure mode unlike the 
PROMETHEE technique whose analysis difficulty increases as the 
number of decision criteria increases.
•  The proposed technique does not require maintenance practitioners 
to define preference function for each decision criteria which is an 
additional burden created by PROMETHEE approach.
In conclusion, it is evident from this research that the proposed method 
is capable of solving risk prioritisation problem more effectively 
than the traditional FMEA approach and its variants. Further work 
can be performed by incorporating other decision criteria such as 
environmental impact and expected revenue into the risk prioritisation 
process.
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